The dangerous delusion of modern warfare | The Economist
Essay<br>Easier to start, harder to win<br>Our defence editor assesses how wars have changed in recent years
May 28th 2026
It has never been a great time to be an infantryman. But today’s conditions are especially pitiable. In the “kill zone” imposed by both sides’ drones in eastern Ukraine, the risk of finding yourself inside a lethal video game is omnipresent. In February Ukrainian troops trying to join the small number of their comrades still inside Myrnohrad, a town in Donetsk, knew that Russian drones operated by well-hidden pilots would make it impossible to do so in vehicles. They had to infiltrate gingerly through the forests. It could take weeks. They might not get out for months.
The after-effects might last years. Soldiers returned from the front keep their windows covered and lights dimmed even when hundreds of kilometres outside the zone. Trapped in what psychologists speak of as hypervigilance and hyperarousal, the sound of a drone can trigger fear and a feeling of helplessness. They glance up as they walk.
As the battle for Myrnohrad was grinding on, American and Israeli jets taking part in the other great-power war of the moment were bombarding Iran at will. Their pilots had everything they needed to pound, assess and pound again, all the sensors the world’s most advanced military forces could bring to bear—on-board infrared and radar, back-up from drones nearby and radar farther off, satellite oversight and more besides. Israel hacked traffic cameras in Tehran to track Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country’s supreme leader, as it closed in to kill him.
Such different wars in their prosecution. But in other ways oddly similar. Both the war in Ukraine and the war over Iran are shaped by technology which has introduced a new transparency to the places and situations in which armies fight. This transparency is not complete. It is always partial, always sporadic, always subject to challenge. But over the eight years since your correspondent left the world of think-tanks to become The Economist’s defence editor, a post he is now leaving for pastures new, it has been warfare’s defining technological trend.
There are other similarities between Ukraine and Iran. Both are wars instigated by the leaders of great powers in the apparent belief of easy victory. Both have developed in ways those leaders did not anticipate into something like a stalemate—stalemates in which, for Russia and America alike, a lack of victory looks increasingly like defeat. Are technological changes making the role of the defender easier? Or systematically encouraging big powers to start wars they cannot win? Or is this merely a case of business as usual—great powers blundering into ill-advised wars that reflect the prevailing technologies of the day?
The question matters because war is a somewhat booming industry. The Uppsala Conflict Data Programme recorded 65 active state-based conflicts—wars where at least one belligerent is a state and which result in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year—in 2025, the highest level since its records began in 1946. They included eight wars categorised as state-on-state, two with annual battle-death rates over 1,000. The Peace Research Institute Oslo identifies a similarly bleak trend. “Despite a sharp decrease in battle-related deaths from 2022 to 2023,” it observed, “the past four years have been the most violent period since the end of the cold war.”
65 conflicts
Major conflict*
Minor conflict†
Burkina Faso v JNIM
29 conflicts
States v non-state groups<br>with foreign involvement
Nigeria v IS
Ethiopia
Armenia v Azerbaijan
States v non-state groups
Afghanistan
Israel v Hamas
Sudan
Between<br>states
Russia v Ukraine
Israel v Iran
2010
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
*At least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a year
†At least 25
Source: “Organised violence 1989-2025, and violent political<br>protests”,<br>by S. Davies, T. Pettersson and M. Öberg, Journal of Peace Research<br>(forthcoming)
65 conflicts
Major conflict*
Minor conflict†
Burkina Faso v JNIM
29 conflicts
States v non-state groups<br>with foreign involvement
Ethiopia
Nigeria v IS
Armenia v<br>Azerbaijan
States v non-state groups
Afghanistan
Israel v Hamas
Sudan
Between states
Russia v<br>Ukraine
Israel v<br>Iran
2010
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
*At least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a year
†At least 25
Source: “Organised violence 1989-2025, and violent political<br>protests”,<br>by S. Davies, T. Pettersson and M. Öberg, Journal of Peace Research<br>(forthcoming)
Major conflict*
Minor conflict†
29 conflicts
2010
States v<br>non-state<br>groups with<br>foreign<br>involvement
States v<br>non-state<br>groups
2015
Afghanistan
Nigeria v IS
Armenia v<br>Azerbaijan
2020
Between<br>states
Burkina Faso<br>v JNIM
Russia v<br>Ukraine
Israel v<br>Hamas
Ethiopia
Israel v<br>Iran
Sudan
2025
65 conflicts
*At least 1,000 battle-related...