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Preference falsification

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Stating a preference not truly held

Preference falsification is the act of misrepresenting a preference under perceived public pressure. It involves publicly expressing a preference that differs from one's underlying privately held preference (or simply, a public preference at odds with one’s private preference). People frequently convey to each other preferences that differ from what they would communicate privately under credible cover of anonymity (such as in opinion surveys to researchers or pollsters).[1] Techniques such as list experiments[2] can be used to uncover preference falsification.[3][4]

The term was coined by economist and political scientist Timur Kuran in a 1987 article, "Chameleon voters and public choice."[5] On controversial matters that induce preference falsification, he showed there, widely disliked policies may appear popular. The distribution of public preferences, which Kuran defines as public opinion, may differ greatly from private opinion, which is the distribution of private preferences known only to individuals themselves.

Kuran developed the implications in a 1995 book, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification.[6][7] He argues that preference falsification is not only ubiquitous but has major social and political consequences. He provides a theory of how preference falsification shapes collective illusions, sustains social stability, distorts human knowledge, and conceals political possibilities. Collective illusion is an occurrence when most people in a group go along with an idea or a preference that they don't agree with, because they incorrectly believe that most people in the group agree with it.[8]

Specific form of lying<br>[edit]

Preference falsification aims specifically at molding the perceptions others hold about one’s motivations. As such, not all forms of lying entail preference falsification. To withhold bad medical news from a terminally ill person is a charitable lie. But it is not preference falsification, because the motivation is not to conceal a wish.[9]

Preference falsification is not synonymous with self-censorship, which is simply the withholding of information. Whereas self-censorship is a passive act, preference falsification is performative. It entails actions meant to project a contrived preference.[10]

Strategic voting occurs when, in the privacy of an election booth, one votes for candidate B because A, one’s favorite, cannot win. This entails preference manipulation but not preference falsification, which is a response to social pressures. In a private polling booth, there are no social pressures to accommodate and no social reactions to control.[10]

Private opinion vs. public opinion<br>[edit]

The term public opinion is commonly used in two senses. The first is the distribution of people’s genuine preferences, often measured through surveys that provide anonymity. The second meaning is the distribution of preferences that people convey in public settings, which is measured through survey techniques that allow the pairing of responses with specific respondents. Kuran distinguishes between the two meanings for analytic clarity, reserving public opinion only for the latter. He uses the term private opinion to describe the distribution of a society’s private preferences, known only to individuals themselves.[11]

On socially controversial issues, preference falsification is often pervasive, and ordinarily public opinion differs from private opinion.[12]

Private knowledge vs. public knowledge<br>[edit]

Private preferences over a set of options rest on private knowledge, which consists of the understandings that individuals carry in their own minds. A person who privately favors reforming the educational system does so in the belief that, say, schools are failing students, and a new curriculum would serve them better. But this person need not convey to others his sympathy towards a new curriculum. To avoid alienating powerful political groups, she could pretend to consider the prevailing curriculum optimal. In other words, her public knowledge could be a distorted, if not completely fabricated, version of what she really perceives and understands.[13]

Knowledge falsification causes public knowledge to differ from private knowledge.[13]

Three main claims of Kuran's theory<br>[edit]

Private Truths, Public Lies identifies three basic social consequences of preference falsification: distortion of social decisions, distortion of private knowledge, and unanticipated social discontinuities.

Distortion of social decisions<br>[edit]

Among the social consequences of preference falsification is the distortion of...