Stealth isn’t Strategy: Post-Stealth Warfare will be a “Dirty Mix” of Humans and Robots - Military Strategy Magazine

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Stealth isn’t Strategy: Post-Stealth Warfare will be a “Dirty Mix” of Humans and Robots

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Stealth isn’t Strategy: Post-Stealth Warfare will be a “Dirty Mix” of Humans and Robots<br>Jahara Matisek

- U.S. Air Force

May 28, 2026

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To cite this article:

Matisek, Jahara, “Stealth isn’t Strategy: Post-Stealth Warfare will be a “Dirty Mix” of Humans and Robots,” Military Strategy Magazine, Exclusive Article, May 28 2026. https://doi.org/10.64148/msm.exclusive.15071

About the author<br>Jahara Matisek, Ph.D., is a U.S. Air Force command pilot, senior fellow at the Payne Institute for Public Policy, and a visiting scholar at Northwestern University. He is the most published officer currently serving with two books and over 200 articles on the defense industrial base, strategy, and warfare.

Disclaimer: The views in this article are his own and do not represent those of the U.S. Air Force, Department of War, or any part of the U.S. government.<br>A 2026 report by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies contended the U.S. Air Force needs 200 B-21s and 300 F-47s “to deny enemy sanctuaries,” which contrasts with the current plan of buying 100 B-21s and 185 F-47s.[1] The Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command recently told Congress, “I would favor 200 B-21 bombers… Not just for the nuclear deterrence mission, but for penetrating strike capabilities,” and the Secretary of War similarly stated, “We believe we’ll require a lot more, over 100, in the future.”[2] This doctrinaire focus on quantities of exquisite stealth platforms (and their missions) frames American military strategy as an inventory issue, not emerging battlefield realities.<br>But this is the wrong argument, because it reflects a deeper strategic malaise. M.L.R. Smith has warned of this type of “bad strategy” formulation due to a fixation on platforms and technology, which masquerades as actual strategy.[3] Similarly, Lawrence Freedman has noted how many policymakers are seduced by visions of clean, technological revolutions while ignoring the messy, enduring nature of war itself.[4]<br>America’s fleet of stealth platforms is facing a crisis of relevance. The West is hurtling towards a ‘stealth cliff’ by pouring resources into platforms like the F-35. Planned for service until 2070, this aircraft will become detectable and obsolete decades sooner. This dismantles the foundation of modern American power. For decades, power projection was an unfair fight, built on stealth. Enabling America’s command of the commons, it allowed U.S. forces to kill adversaries who could not effectively shoot back.[5]<br>That era is ending.<br>Advances in sensing, particularly in quantum technologies and networked sensors, are challenging assumptions that sustained the radar age.[6] An F-35 or B-2 may have a radar cross-section smaller than an insect, but its atoms cannot ‘hide’ from an optical sensor, quantum measurement device, or a satellite.[7] Similarly, China claims to have developed quantum sensors capable of detecting the most silent American submarines.[8] The reality is that detection is becoming more persistent, distributed, and less dependent on traditional radar cross-section tools. Stealth’s technological overmatch is shrinking, a vulnerability made obvious by Iran damaging an F-35 in 2026 with a simple, optically-guided munition immune to electronic countermeasures.[9] This “358” loitering missile also managed to shoot down an F-15E and 24 MQ-9s.[10]<br>This shift marks the beginning of a post-stealth era defined by pervasive exposure. As detection capabilities converge, survivability becomes temporary and precision, while lethal, is no longer rare. Effective warfighting now depends less on avoiding detection and more on the ability to absorb losses, regenerate combat power, and sustain a high operational tempo, especially as American-made precision weapons are jammed in the Russo-Ukraine War.[11]<br>In this new reality, building more exquisite platforms is not a strategy; it is a blind bet that the conditions which made them dominant will persist. They will not. The U.S. military and its coalition saw how quickly years of stockpiled high-end munitions were expended in the 2026 Iran War, a stockpile that will now take years to replace.[12]<br>This argument builds on, but moves beyond, longstanding debates over the “high-low mix” in force design. These usually...