The economics behind the Spurs. - by Jasper Gould
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The economics behind the Spurs.<br>Understanding the team whose future lies in the hands of one seven-footer.<br>Jun 12, 2026
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As an investor, you could call Victor Wembenyama the most mispriced asset in professional sports. He is making $13.4 million this season. Next year his rookie deal will step up to $16.9 million. But on July 6th, soon after the end of the NBA finals, he will become eligible for an extension that is likely to land somewhere between $251 million and $302 million for five years, with escalator clauses tied to MVP, All-NBA, and DPOY pushing the total salary higher.<br>The spread between his current contract and what he is likely worth is entirely unprecedented in American sports. The Spurs have been paying pennies while riding first class, and the bargain won’t last much longer.<br>What happens to San Antonio and the small market franchise model more broadly is likely to change soon.<br>To understand the Wemby situation you have to realize how the NBA salary cap actually works.<br>The cap is set every year as a fixed percentage of Basketball Related Income (BRI), the total pool of revenue shared between players and owners under the current CBA. For 25/26, the salary cap sits at $141 million and there is a luxury tax threshold around $172 million and a second apron (the hard ceiling that severely restricts roster flexibility) at $189 million.<br>The $76 billion media rights deal that was signed in 2024 has hypercharged the BRI. The cap is on a path to go above $160 million in the next three years. Every dollar that the cap rises increases the amount that franchises can offer their stars. Wemby hit the cap this season, a rookie cap, of $13.4 million. That’s less than 10% of the current league salary cap. You’re not supposed to be allowed to have a team with a superstar that only eats up 10% of your salary cap space — but the Spurs have that, and it’s an advantage that will soon be withdrawn.
A five-year max extension for Wemby would begin in 27/28 and would pay him 30% of the cap per year if he earns a designated player escalator triggered by MVP, DPOY, or All-NBA. Based on the current path of the salary cap, that would be roughly $55-60 million per year in Year One of this extension (2027/28). For some context, De’Aaron Fox, the star point guard of the Spurs, signed a four-year $228 million extension last August. Fox’s deal pays him aroudn $57 million in 26/27. Wemby will earn about the same amount, despite being a universally recognized better player.<br>This is because max contracts are set by a cap, not by market value. Wemby’s extension will pay him the max that rules allow. If NBA salaries were determined by free market auctions, he would be getting paid hundreds of millions a year. The implication for the Spurs is that these two players, Fox and Wemby, will soon be eating up around 70% of their cap, before we even consider a third rotational player.<br>San Antonio is not a large market. It is the 24th largest media market in the United States, behind Portland, Sacramento, and Las Vegas. The Spurs’ local television deal is one of the smallest in the league. The Frost Bank Center, the Spurs’ Arena, holds 18,148 fans and generates gate revenue that the Knicks, Lakers, or Warriors could overtake in two road games. The NBA’s revenue sharing system was designed exactly for this situation. Roughly one half of BRI revenue is distributed across all teams, evenly. This allows the Spurs to have budget to create an evenly matched team against competitors like the Knicks, whose media market is naturally going to be far more lucrative. The Spurs are currently worth around $3.2 billion which puts them in the bottom quartile of NBA teams. The New York Rangers are worth about the same as the Spurs.
This is important because the franchise model depends on one thing more than any other: draft the best young star before others see the potential, hold on to him, and build a superteam around him. The Spurs have done it with David Robinson, Tim Duncan, and now — Victor. The most lucrative years, perhaps, are the ones between drafting the player, and having to pay them the market rate for their talent, or something closer to it. I mean to say that the Spurs are drunk on the best period their team might ever experience — they are getting a player who may become the greatest ever, for the price of a mediocre one. That’s all going to come to a stop in July.<br>The Spurs need to answer the question — how do you remain competitive when your top two players are eating up nearly all of your salary cup budget? The second apron is a key constraint: teams that exceed it can’t use the mid-level exception to sign free agents, cannot aggregate salaries and sign-and-trades, and can’t add players via trade if it pushes them further into the apron. It is designed to prevent the ultra-rich franchises, like Golden State in the Draymond / Curry / Klay era, the Celtics...