The Productive Sovereign - Gregg Barber
Gregg Barber
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The Productive Sovereign<br>What They Built, What They’re Doing, and What You Can Do About It
Gregg Barber<br>Jun 15, 2026
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Something is wrong and you already know it.
Not the ambient wrong of bad news cycles or political dysfunction — something structural. Something that feels less like a problem to be solved and more like a tide going out. You sense it in the job market, in the prices, in the way institutions that were supposed to protect you seem increasingly oriented toward something else entirely. You can’t quite name it yet.
This document will name it.
What They Built
For the better part of four decades, a remarkable concentration of wealth and technological power was assembled in the United States under a simple premise: that markets, freed from friction, would generate prosperity that distributed itself broadly.
The premise was borrowed from classical economics. John Bates Clark’s Marginal Productivity Theory — still the foundation of how most economists justify wage structures — holds that in a competitive market, workers are paid what they produce. The system, properly functioning, is self-correcting and fair.
What no one adequately modeled was what happens when the tools of production stop belonging to the workers.
The economists who got closest were Daron Acemoglu and Pascual Restrepo, whose task-based model of labor and automation documented with precision what was already being felt in American communities: that automation doesn’t simply augment workers — it *displaces* them from tasks, and the new tasks created don’t necessarily appear at the same wage level, in the same places, or accessible to the same people.
Erik Brynjolfsson named the trap: the “Turing Trap.” The incentive structure of AI development rewards systems that replace humans entirely over systems that make humans more capable. Full replacement is cleaner to measure, easier to monetize, and more legible to capital markets. Augmentation is messier. So the technology develops in the direction of replacement — not because anyone decided this was the right outcome for society, but because that’s where the incentives pointed.
The infrastructure was built. The capital accumulated. The tools were ready.
What They’re Doing
In 1997, James Dale Davidson and William Rees-Mogg published *The Sovereign Individual*. It was framed as prophecy. It reads, in retrospect, more like a plan.
The book argued that digital technology would dissolve the nation-state’s monopoly on power, that taxation would become voluntary for those with sufficient mobility and capital, and that a new cognitive elite would emerge — sovereign individuals unconstrained by geography, accountability, or the claims of the communities that produced them.
The book was correct about the technology. It was correct about the trajectory of power. What it presented as inevitable was, in practice, a set of choices — choices made by specific people, with specific interests, who found in its deterministic framing a useful absolution.
What followed can be understood in three movements.
Plunder . The extraction of maximum value from existing systems — labor forces built by public education, infrastructure built by public investment, markets built by regulatory frameworks, scientific foundations built by public research. The internet. GPS. The foundational AI research from publicly funded universities. Each of these became the substrate for private accumulation on a scale history had rarely seen.
Burn . The systematic erosion of the institutional architecture that made the extraction possible — and that might, if left intact, constrain what comes next. Tax structures that sustained the commons. Regulatory frameworks that distributed market power. Democratic institutions capable of collective response to concentrated wealth. Korninek and Stiglitz documented this dynamic precisely: the direction of technological innovation is not neutral — it can be aimed, and it has been aimed, at outcomes that concentrate returns rather than distribute them.
Escape . This is the movement currently underway.
By late 2025, there were 120 startup societies worldwide actively courting billionaires who had decided that the nation-states which incubated their wealth were now liabilities. Balaji Srinivasan, addressing the Network State Conference in Singapore, called it the “ultimate exit.” Peter Thiel and Marc Andreessen are backing semi-autonomous zones — nations within nations, or communities at sea, or eventually colonies on other planets — that would provide the cognitive elite with sovereign infrastructure entirely outside the accountability of democratic institutions.
Yanis Varoufakis named the destination: techno-feudalism. Not a return to medieval hierarchy but something structurally similar — a world in which those who control the AI infrastructure extract rents from everyone who depends on it, as...