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Memory-Safe Stack Eliminates a CVE Class

Most of the QUIC CVEs of 2024-2025 are implementation<br>bugs, not protocol flaws. CVE-2024-24989 and CVE-2024-35200 were memory-safety defects<br>in NGINX&rsquo;s C QUIC module. CVE-2025-54939<br>(&ldquo;QUIC-LEAK&rdquo;) is a pre-handshake memory exhaustion in LiteSpeed&rsquo;s<br>LSQUIC. CVE-2025-4820 is an optimistic-ACK congestion-control<br>flaw in Cloudflare&rsquo;s quiche. A proxy does not &ldquo;mitigate&rdquo; these by<br>configuration - it avoids the entire bug class by not running the affected code.

pqcrypta-proxy speaks HTTP/3, QUIC, and WebTransport through the Rust<br>quinn 0.11 + h3 + rustls stack<br>(wtransport for WebTransport), all memory-safe. The endpoint advertises<br>QUIC v1 only (RFC 9000) plus the reserved GREASE version per<br>RFC 9287, overriding quinn&rsquo;s default list so Version Negotiation never offers<br>the obsolete draft versions it cannot actually complete. That is a deliberate<br>downgrade-surface reduction at the endpoint layer.

The Vulnerability → Mitigation Map

Each row is a documented issue, tagged with one or more of the<br>Implemented<br>Stack-avoided<br>Bounded<br>classes defined in &ldquo;How to read the mapping&rdquo; above.

Documented issue<br>Class<br>pqcrypta-proxy control

0-RTT / early-data replay<br>RFC 9001 §9.2, TLS 1.3 early data<br>Implemented<br>0-RTT replay nonce store (strict/session/none); per-route enable_0rtt; startup conflict check rejects 0-RTT on non-safe routes - tls_acceptor.rs

UDP amplification / reflection<br>RFC 9000 §8.1; QUIC-LEAK CVE-2025-54939<br>Stack-avoided<br>quinn enforces the 3× anti-amplification limit + stateless Retry address validation; LSQUIC bug not in this stack - quic_listener.rs

Optimistic / acknowledgement-based ACK DDoS<br>CVE-2025-4820 (quiche)<br>Stack-avoided Bounded<br>Congestion control is quinn&rsquo;s, not quiche&rsquo;s; per-IP / JA3 rate limiting + circuit breaker cap the rate any single peer can extract

QUIC handshake flooding<br>QFAM research (arXiv 2412.08936)<br>Stack-avoided Bounded<br>Retry-based address validation before crypto state is allocated; multi-dimensional rate limiting on the QUIC path; connection caps

Rapid Reset stream-flood DoS<br>CVE-2023-44487 (H2) + H3 stream variant<br>Implemented Bounded<br>Rate limiting applied on both TCP (H1/H2) and QUIC/HTTP3 paths; tested by pentest Script 07; circuit breaker isolates a stressed backend

NGINX HTTP/3 memory defects<br>CVE-2024-24989 / CVE-2024-35200<br>Stack-avoided<br>Memory-safe Rust h3/quinn; not the NGINX C QUIC module

Cross-origin WebTransport hijacking<br>same-origin policy (WebTransport overview draft)<br>Implemented<br>SR-02 origin validation: webtransport_allowed_origins allowlist, 403 on mismatch - webtransport handler

WebTransport stream / datagram flooding<br>multiplexed-channel resource exhaustion<br>Implemented<br>Per-origin limits: max sessions/origin, streams/session, datagrams/sec enforced

PQC downgrade attack<br>classical-only forced negotiation<br>Implemented<br>PQC downgrade detection: block (421) / log / allow when X25519MLKEM768 was required - pqc_tls.rs

TCP middlebox / WAF blindness on QUIC<br>encrypted transport header<br>Implemented<br>WAF + JA3/JA4 fingerprinting + rate limiting run at the proxy on the decrypted H3/WebTransport path, not on a blind appliance

MASQUE / CONNECT-UDP open-relay abuse<br>RFC 9298 tunnelling<br>Implemented<br>Disabled by default; host:port allowlist, per-session idle timeout, per-connection session cap - [masque]

Transfer-Encoding injection / H3 smuggling<br>RFC 9114 §4.2<br>Implemented<br>Hop-by-hop headers stripped before forwarding; TE prohibited on H3; tested across 5 protocols - see HTTP Smuggling research

IP spoofing via forwarding...