Why Fear Matters in Governing Military AI | TechPolicy.PressPerspective<br>Why Fear Matters in Governing Military AI<br>Pedro Kritski, Virgílio Almeida / Jul 10, 2026United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres speaks about the release of a UN report on artificial intelligence during a news conference at UN headquarters, Wednesday, July 1, 2026. (AP Photo/Jason DeCrow)
Republish
Share
In May, officials from the United States and China returned to the negotiating table to discuss artificial intelligence—an issue as consequential this century as nuclear weapons were during the Cold War. But AI poses a fundamentally different challenge. Its capabilities are difficult to measure, evolve at extraordinary speed, and are increasingly intertwined with economic competitiveness, military power, and the strategic interests of a handful of technology companies. The emergence of two AI superpowers facing shared risks without shared rules presents one of the most urgent governance challenges of the twenty-first century.<br>Among these risks, the growing use of autonomous AI systems in military decision-making deserves particular attention. Unlike traditional weapons, such systems may operate at speeds and levels of complexity that exceed human understanding and effective oversight. As machines take on greater roles in surveillance, targeting, and battlefield operations, the risk of errors, accidents, and unintended escalation increases. The prospect that critical decisions about the use of force could be delegated to algorithms raises profound questions about accountability, human control, and international security. In short, extreme military AI risks include high-consequence outcomes arising from autonomous systems operating beyond effective human oversight.<br>History suggests that governance often emerges in response to perceived extreme risk. Nuclear arms control, environmental regulation, and public health institutions gained support only as societies recognized the scale of the threats involved. Fear of nuclear catastrophe helped mobilize public backing for arms-control agreements, while international pressure from governments, scientists, and public health organizations led to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling, and use of biological and toxin weapons.These examples show how scientific concern and international cooperation can establish global norms against high-risk technologies.<br>Similar concerns about autonomous military AI may create the political conditions for new forms of oversight and international cooperation. These concerns were on display last week, when United Nations Secretary General António Guterres called for a ban on “killer robots.” Without a shared understanding of the risks, efforts to build safeguards may lack the urgency needed to keep pace with technological change. We argue that philosophy can help clarify the ethical foundations needed to govern military AI before its risks become irreversible.<br>When rivals start talking<br>Both Washington and Beijing recognize the risks of advanced AI, yet neither is prepared to slow its pursuit of technological leadership. Both worry that restraint would confer a strategic advantage to the other. But despite what some argue, AI is not a race with a finish line. Framing it as one may intensify tensions and increase the very risks both sides seek to avoid. As the nuclear era showed, rivalry does not eliminate the need for cooperation to prevent catastrophe. The race for advanced AI leadership is intensifying. Mirroring the Cold War, mastery of this technology and being the first to achieve “superintelligence” is now seen as a matter of survival and deterrence. However, growing recognition shows this rivalry could spiral out of control. We urgently need risk-reduction mechanisms to prevent accidents, cyberattacks, and autonomous system failures.<br>Perhaps the most revealing fact is this: when rival powers begin discussing crisis-management protocols for AI, the issue has clearly moved beyond the realm of science fiction. The possibility that advanced systems could be used in extreme geopolitical conflicts has become part of the real calculus of international security. Yet how can we ensure that errors do not occur—or that they are not transmitted and amplified through systems that remain only partially understood even by their creators? How can we guarantee the responsible use of technologies whose inner workings we do not fully comprehend? Is it possible to control the use of AI on the battlefield at a safe level?<br>Joseph Weizenbaum, the MIT computer scientist who created ELIZA in 1966, was among the first critics of AI and its military applications. For him, AI was too important to be left solely in the hands of computer scientists and required the participation of philosophers, social scientists, and scholars from other disciplines. Weizenbaum warned that AI was a dual-use...