How Ukraine Built a War Fighting State - Austin Vernon's Blog

How Ukraine Built a War Fighting State

2026 July 10<br>Twitter<br>Substack

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The engine is revving after years of war.

Fighting for Survival

I've been following the Ukrainian-Russian war since 2022. Most Western analyses favored the Russians to win because of their much bigger population and economy. Yet the Ukrainians continue to hold back the Russians and have recently shifted the momentum their way. How did the Ukrainians achieve this? The following are some of my imperfect observations.

The Importance of Productivity

Russia's population is ~5x that of Ukraine's, and its economy is similarly larger. Defenders have the advantage, but Ukraine needs to do more than defend to win. The obvious implication is that the Ukrainians must kill Russians relentlessly, produce more combat power per worker, and use that combat power more effectively.

The outcome of the war has global importance. Many countries support their favored side. Ukraine has the support of most industrialized, rich countries, while Russia relies on nearby autocracies. These outside actors can and do have large impacts on the fighting.

The victory formula for Ukraine is to develop better technology, manage its resources shrewdly, and leverage allies.

Allocating Scarce Resources

A famous saying is that a small Soviet Army can't beat a large Soviet Army. Tactics tend to be predictable and frontal, advantaging the larger force. A critical challenge for the Ukrainians at the beginning of the war was that roughly two-thirds of their army commanders still held onto Soviet beliefs. Not only were these commanders less effective, but if the army tried to maintain a certain number of men and weapons in each unit, then the poorly run outfits that wasted resources would hoover up recruits, weapons, and ammo. These commanders' wastage of human life in direct assaults has been one of the most pressing domestic political issues of the war. It deters recruits and encourages draft dodging. Effectively allocating resources was the first major task.

Manning the Brigades

A combination of politics, wartime pressure, and a lack of replacement leaders made command switches difficult. At first, the Ukrainians tried sending recruits to new units while letting the fielded units dwindle. The reviews were quite negative as the new units were ineffective. The next reforms involved the formation of larger units ("corps") made up of several formerly independent brigades. One good commander could then take on 3x-4x more soldiers. In addition, AWOL troops were allowed to return without penalty, and they could choose which unit to join. The most effective units that respected their soldiers could grow (especially with the larger corps structure) relative to the poor performers.

The same pressures that make bad commanders hard to replace also protected good commanders who ignored misguided orders from above. Coordinating larger force groupings is challenging, but foolish orders do not doom the entire Ukrainian Army at once.

Another key reform has been to move most drone pilots from the typical army command into the Unmanned Systems Forces under the competent leadership of Robert Brovdi. Increasing drone effectiveness (both combat and logistics) took pressure off the infantry.

These reforms are still incomplete. Complaints of hopeless frontal assaults and the creation of new brigades continue. The Ukrainian military's commander-in-chief still has some Soviet tendencies and siphons recruits to "Assault Infantry" units he has tighter command of. But there is uneven progress towards a more effective fighting force.

Supplying the Brigades

Adverse selection is also present in resupply for items like drones. There is extreme variance in drone team efficacy, and poorly performing teams waste limited resources.

The solution was a market and "currency" for units to buy equipment and supplies. Brigade-level units purchase drones directly from the manufacturers using the "Brave" marketplace. The currency in the marketplace is points that units earn from video-confirmed kills of Russians. Drones flow to the most effective units, those units work closely with the manufacturers, and they can choose from a range of options depending on their current mission and Russian tactics.

Elevating New Leaders

The Ukrainians have excelled at putting exceptional leaders in key positions despite many challenges in scaling human resources. A few examples are:

Kyrylo Budanov, working his way up from a special forces leader in 2014 to the head of military intelligence in 2022 to the President's chief of staff in 2026.

Alexander Kamyshin excelled at managing the train system under fire in 2022. He took over the rationalization of Ukraine's defense industry and helped to start many weapons programs that are now bearing fruit.

Robert Brovdi began the war as a civilian grain trader and now leads Ukraine's unmanned systems...