[2607.12624] PVDetector: Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks on Purpose-Specific LLM Agents through Policy-Violation Concept Analysis
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arXiv:2607.12624 (cs)
[Submitted on 14 Jul 2026]
Title:PVDetector: Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks on Purpose-Specific LLM Agents through Policy-Violation Concept Analysis
Authors:Junhui Wang, Hangtao Zhang, Zhirun Zheng, Li Zeng, Jiejun Xiao, Xi Luo, Lihua Yin, Saiqin Long<br>View a PDF of the paper titled PVDetector: Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks on Purpose-Specific LLM Agents through Policy-Violation Concept Analysis, by Junhui Wang and 7 other authors
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Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as purpose-specific agents to handle domain-specific tasks such as customer service and code generation. These agents are expected to comply with not only generic safety guardrails but also purpose-specific restrictions tailored to their designated roles. Such additional restrictions enlarge the attack surface, particularly to prompt injection (PI) attacks. To defend against such attacks, existing detection methods primarily rely on analyzing input-output patterns, yet yield limited effectiveness. To address this limitation, we turn to analyzing the hidden activation space and discover that LLMs inherently retain latent policy-violation (PV) concepts when prompted with requests beyond their designated purpose. Particularly, PV concepts capture the semantics of conflicts between user queries and predefined restrictions, implicitly reflecting LLMs' intrinsic awareness of recognizing policy violations. Building on this insight, we propose PVDetector, a training-free framework that detects PI attacks during LLM inference by measuring hidden-state alignment with PV concepts, which are derived offline from the contrastive pairs of policy-violating and policy-compliant prompts. Experiments across multiple LLMs and datasets show that PVDetector achieves this https URL .
Comments:<br>Accepted to ACM MM 2026. Code: this https URL
Subjects:
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as:<br>arXiv:2607.12624 [cs.CR]
(or<br>arXiv:2607.12624v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.12624
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arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
Submission history<br>From: Junhui Wang [view email]<br>[v1]<br>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 11:01:10 UTC (5,471 KB)
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