[2604.20927] Hidden Secrets in the arXiv: Discovering, Analyzing, and Preventing Unintentional Information Disclosure in Source Files of Scientific Preprints

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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security

arXiv:2604.20927 (cs)

[Submitted on 22 Apr 2026]

Title:Hidden Secrets in the arXiv: Discovering, Analyzing, and Preventing Unintentional Information Disclosure in Source Files of Scientific Preprints

Authors:Jan Pennekamp, Johannes Lohmöller, David Schütte, Joscha Loos, Martin Henze<br>View a PDF of the paper titled Hidden Secrets in the arXiv: Discovering, Analyzing, and Preventing Unintentional Information Disclosure in Source Files of Scientific Preprints, by Jan Pennekamp and 4 other authors

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Abstract:Preprints are essential for the timely and open dissemination of research. arXiv, the most widely used preprint service, takes the idea of open science one step further by not only publishing the actual preprints but also LaTeX sources and other files used to create them. As known from other contexts, such as GitHub repositories, and anecdotally exemplified for arXiv, making source code publicly available risks disclosing otherwise "hidden" information. Consequently, the public availability of paper sources raises the question of how much sensitive content is (unintentionally) disclosed through them.

In this paper, we systematically answer this question for all 2.7M arXiv submissions with available source files across three dimensions of source file-induced information disclosure: (1) inclusion of unnecessary files, (2) metadata embedded in files, and (3) irrelevant content in files such as source code comments. Our analysis reveals that nearly every arXiv submission contains some form of "hidden" information. Notable findings range from links to editable web documents for internal coordination over API and private keys to complete Git histories.

While different tools promise to remove such information from source files, we show that they fail to reliably achieve the intended cleaning functionality. To mitigate this situation, we provide ALC-NG to comprehensively remove files, metadata, and comments that are not needed to compile a LaTeX paper.

Comments:<br>20 pages, accepted at 47th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '26)

Subjects:

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)

Cite as:<br>arXiv:2604.20927 [cs.CR]

(or<br>arXiv:2604.20927v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.20927

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arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

Related DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1109/SP63933.2026.00217

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DOI(s) linking to related resources

Submission history<br>From: Jan Pennekamp [view email]<br>[v1]<br>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 08:18:10 UTC (451 KB)

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