[2607.14587] Qubes OS Security in the Public Record

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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security

arXiv:2607.14587 (cs)

[Submitted on 16 Jul 2026]

Title:Qubes OS Security in the Public Record

Authors:Alfonso De Gregorio<br>View a PDF of the paper titled Qubes OS Security in the Public Record, by Alfonso De Gregorio

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Abstract:Qubes OS is a revealing case for security measurement because its architecture makes component boundaries security-relevant. We present a protocol-driven longitudinal analysis of 109 public Qubes Security Bulletins (QSBs, 2011--2025), the official Qubes-maintained Xen Security Advisory (XSA) tracker, and a secondary vulnerability-event sensitivity series. The study measures the public advisory record rather than latent vulnerability incidence or realized compromise. The methodology combines audited deterministic component attribution, change-point analysis, overdispersion checks, severity-proxy weighting, censoring sensitivity, documentary latency lower bounds, and baseline-aware evaluation of vulnerability discovery models (VDMs).

The results show persistent upstream dependence in that public record. On the official tracker, 113 of 464 XSAs affect Qubes; under primary labeling, 87 of 109 QSBs (79.8\%) are attributable to Xen, CPU/microarchitectural, or other upstream components rather than Qubes-core logic, with similar results under weighted views. Change-point analyses identify 2015Q1 as the dominant break in the quarterly advisory series, while post-2018 annual disclosure rates are statistically flat. Poisson inferences are stable under dispersion diagnostics and negative-binomial sensitivity checks. The attribution codebook performs well in a stratified 30-QSB audit, and S-shaped VDMs fit descriptively but do not significantly outperform a rolling-mean baseline in short-horizon forecasts.

Overall, the Qubes public advisory record appears stable, but not quiet: disclosure activity plateaus at a higher level than in the earliest years, while the observed burden remains concentrated in upstream trust anchors.

Comments:<br>18 pages, 3 figures, 4 tables, dataset bundle published on Zenodo

Subjects:

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL)

Cite as:<br>arXiv:2607.14587 [cs.CR]

(or<br>arXiv:2607.14587v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.14587

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arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history<br>From: Alfonso De Gregorio [view email]<br>[v1]<br>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 05:33:55 UTC (181 KB)

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