[2502.02713] When Less is More: Evolutionary Dynamics of Deception in a Sender-Receiver Game

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arXiv:2502.02713 (physics)

[Submitted on 4 Feb 2025 (v1), last revised 16 Mar 2025 (this version, v2)]

Title:When Less is More: Evolutionary Dynamics of Deception in a Sender-Receiver Game

Authors:Eduardo V. M. Vieira, José F. Fontanari<br>View a PDF of the paper titled When Less is More: Evolutionary Dynamics of Deception in a Sender-Receiver Game, by Eduardo V. M. Vieira and Jos\'e F. Fontanari

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Abstract:The spread of disinformation poses a significant threat to societal well-being. We analyze this phenomenon using an evolutionary game theory model of the sender-receiver game, where senders aim to mislead receivers and receivers aim to discern the truth. Using a combination of replicator equations, finite-size scaling analysis, and extensive Monte Carlo simulations, we investigate the long-term evolutionary dynamics of this game. Our central finding is a counterintuitive threshold phenomenon: the role (sender or receiver) with the larger difference in payoffs between successful and unsuccessful interactions is surprisingly more likely to lose in the long run. We show that this effect is robust across different parameter values and arises from the interplay between the relative speeds of evolution of the two roles and the ability of the slower evolving role to exploit the fixed strategy of the faster evolving role. Moreover, for finite populations we find that the initially less frequent strategy of the slower role is more likely to fixate in the population. The initially rarer strategy in the less-rewarded role is, paradoxically, more likely to prevail.

Subjects:

Physics and Society (physics.soc-ph); Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems (nlin.AO); Populations and Evolution (q-bio.PE)

Cite as:<br>arXiv:2502.02713 [physics.soc-ph]

(or<br>arXiv:2502.02713v2 [physics.soc-ph] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2502.02713

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arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

Journal reference:<br>Physica A 670 (2025) 130614

Related DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2025.130614

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DOI(s) linking to related resources

Submission history<br>From: Jose Fontanari [view email]<br>[v1]<br>Tue, 4 Feb 2025 20:49:39 UTC (310 KB)

[v2]<br>Sun, 16 Mar 2025 19:28:17 UTC (313 KB)

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