[2607.18538] CryptanalysisBench: Can LLMs do Cryptanalysis?
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arXiv:2607.18538 (cs)
[Submitted on 20 Jul 2026]
Title:CryptanalysisBench: Can LLMs do Cryptanalysis?
Authors:Lukas Fluri, Avital Shafran, Nicholas Carlini, Matthew Jagielski, Milad Nasr, Orr Dunkelman, Eyal Ronen, Florian Tramèr<br>View a PDF of the paper titled CryptanalysisBench: Can LLMs do Cryptanalysis?, by Lukas Fluri and 7 other authors
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Abstract:Cryptanalysis - the task of finding attacks against cryptographic schemes - sits at the intersection of mathematical reasoning and cybersecurity, two areas where LLMs have advanced fastest. Cryptanalysis represents both a clean testbed for frontier reasoning (as practical attacks can be automatically verified) and a domain with unusually high stakes, since the primitives under study underpin our digital security. In this paper we ask whether LLMs can do cryptanalysis, and find that the answer is increasingly yes.
We introduce CryptanalysisBench, 191 tasks across six families of cryptographic primitives (block ciphers, hash functions, etc.) drawn primarily from four NIST standardization competitions. Our benchmark consists of three tiers: (i) primitives with known practical breaks; (ii) primitives with no known practical break, evaluated both at full strength and as scaled-down variants; and (iii) a challenge set of production primitives at the frontier of cryptanalysis.
Five frontier models (Claude Opus 4.8, Sonnet 5, Mythos 5, GPT 5.5, and the open-weights GLM 5.2) break 65%-86% of Tier 1 schemes, 6-12 Tier-2 schemes at full strength, and 24-61 across all scaled-down variants. Beyond deriving known results, models produce novel cryptanalysis, such as a key-recovery attack that exploits a design flaw in the SpoC AEAD and an error in KINDI's published CCA-security proof, both to the best of our knowledge not previously known.
We release CryptanalysisBench as a tool to help track if (or when) AI cryptanalysis becomes a serious factor and as a scaffold for stress-testing candidate schemes before deployment. The attacks that the benchmark already surfaces are an early snapshot of a fast-moving frontier that may soon match, and in places exceed, the published state of the art.
Subjects:
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as:<br>arXiv:2607.18538 [cs.CR]
(or<br>arXiv:2607.18538v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.18538
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arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
Submission history<br>From: Avital Shafran [view email]<br>[v1]<br>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 22:09:40 UTC (1,709 KB)
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