GitHub - prevotai/colmena: Prevot — recibos verificables de reproducción de CVEs de firmware (Señal S1) · GitHub
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Prevot — verifiable receipts for firmware CVE reproduction
Prevot reproduces public, known firmware vulnerabilities deterministically<br>against digital twins, and issues a receipt : a signed attestation that anyone can<br>re-verify — without trusting us, without seeing the exploit.
Evidence, not assertion. The security community is drowning in AI-generated reports<br>that claim vulnerabilities without proving them. A Prevot receipt is the opposite: a<br>cryptographic proof, re-verifiable by third parties, that the reproduction actually<br>happened.
Verify it yourself (5 minutes)
This repo ships a real receipt — CVE-2018-19988 , root command injection on the D-Link<br>DIR-868L rev B router — signed and anchored in the public transparency log Rekor<br>(logIndex 2237342620).
You only need Docker :
cd receipts/examples/dir868l-hnap-19988<br>docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/w" -w /w \<br>gcr.io/projectsigstore/cosign:v2.4.1@sha256:b03690aa52bfe94054187142fba24dc54137650682810633901767d8a3e15b31 \<br>verify-blob --new-bundle-format --bundle statement.cosign.bundle \<br>--certificate-identity 616124453047-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com \<br>--certificate-oidc-issuer https://accounts.google.com \<br>statement.json<br># → Verified OK
Step-by-step, including the tamper test: guides/verify-a-receipt-in-5-min.md.
What makes this receipt different
It also states what it does not know:
Medium grade, declared. It reproduces deterministically (2/2) and discriminates<br>the injection (we proved the effect is caused by the payload, not by the request). It<br>lacks the patched-version control — that firmware is encrypted — so we do not call it<br>high grade.
It corrects a public data point. The CVE is published as exploitable without<br>credentials (PR:N); on the real firmware it requires authentication. We declare it<br>PR:L. Reproduction against the real artifact overrides the metadata.
A verifier that cannot tell its own grades of certainty apart is not a verifier.
How it works
Piece<br>What it is
receipts/schema/<br>the receipt schema (in-toto attestation, evidence by sha256)
receipts/examples/dir868l-hnap-19988/<br>the signed receipt + its evidence
receipts/README.md<br>anatomy of the receipt
receipts/validate_receipt.py<br>optional schema + content-addressing check
guides/<br>the 5-minute verification guide
Signing is keyless (Sigstore/cosign): a short-lived certificate (Fulcio) bound to an<br>identity, anchored in Rekor. No private keys to manage. The bundle is self-contained: it<br>verifies with just this repo and Docker — no access to Prevot's infrastructure .
On the signer. This receipt is signed by a machine identity (the service account<br>that runs the verifier), not a person — honest, since the receipt is produced by<br>automation. A canonical human signature can be added later; Rekor allows multiple<br>signatures over the same receipt.
License
AGPL-3.0-or-later. (See LICENSE.)
Status
Signal S1 — first public proof. This is a first brick of a cyber-physical trust seal<br>for firmware under the European regulatory framework (CRA/RED).
About<br>Prevot — recibos verificables de reproducción de CVEs de firmware (Señal S1)<br>Resources<br>Readme<br>AGPL-3.0 license<br>Activity<br>Custom properties<br>Stars<br>0 stars<br>Watchers<br>0 watching<br>Forks<br>0 forks<br>Report repository
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