Talent Hoarding in Organizations - American Economic Association
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Home<br>Journals<br>American Economic Review<br>August 2026<br>Talent Hoarding in Organizations
American Economic Review
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About the AEREditors<br>Editorial Policy<br>Annual Report of the Editor<br>Editorial Process: Discussions with the Editors<br>Research Highlights<br>Contact Information
Articles and IssuesCurrent Issue<br>All Issues<br>Forthcoming Articles
Information for Authors and ReviewersSubmission Guidelines<br>Accepted Article Guidelines<br>Style Guide<br>Reviewer Guidelines
Talent Hoarding in Organizations
Ingrid Haegele
American Economic Review
vol. 116,<br>no. 8, August 2026
(pp. 3110–51)
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Article Information
Abstract
Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers. However, managers who are evaluated on team performance have an incentive to hoard workers. This study provides the first empirical evidence of talent hoarding using personnel records and survey evidence from a large firm. Talent hoarding is self-reported by three-fourths of managers, is detectable in manager ratings of worker talent, and occurs more frequently under stronger hoarding incentives, proxied by performance-related pay, team size, and talent visibility. Using quasi-random exposure to talent hoarding, I show that hoarding deters internal job applications, inhibiting career progression and altering talent allocation in the firm.
Citation
Haegele, Ingrid.<br>2026.
"Talent Hoarding in Organizations."
American Economic Review
116 (8):<br>3110–51.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220264
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JEL Classification
D22<br>Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
J23<br>Labor Demand
L60<br>Industry Studies: Manufacturing: General
M12<br>Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
M51<br>Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
M54<br>Personnel Economics: Labor Management
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