The Vietnam of Computer Science · Ted Neward's Blog

(Two years ago, at Microsoft’s TechEd in San Diego, I was involved in a conversation at an after-conference event with Harry Pierson and Clemens Vasters, and as is typical when the three of us get together, architectural topics were at the forefront of our discussions. An crowd gathered around us, and it turned into an impromptu birds-of-a-feather session. The subject of object/relational mapping technologies came up, and it was there and then that I first coined the phrase, “Object/relational mapping is the Vietnam of Computer Science”. In the intervening time, I’ve received numerous requests to flesh out the discussion behind that statement, and given Microsoft’s recent announcement regarding “entity support” in ADO.NET 3.0 and the acceptance of the Java Persistence API as a replacement for both EJB Entity Beans and JDO, it seemed time to do exactly that.)

No armed conflict in US history haunts the American military more than the Vietnam War, aka “Vietnam”. So many divergent elements coalesced to create the most decisive turning point in modern American history that it defies any layman’s attempt to tease them apart. And yet, the story of Vietnam is fundamentally a simple one: The United States began a military project with simple yet unclear and conflicting goals, and quickly became enmeshed in a quagmire that not only brought down two governments (one legally, one through force of arms), but also deeply scarred American military doctrine for the next four decades (at least).

Although it may seem trite to say it, Object/Relational Mapping is the Vietnam of Computer Science . It represents a quagmire which starts well, gets more complicated as time passes, and before long entraps its users in a commitment that has no clear demarcation point, no clear win conditions, and no clear exit strategy.

History

PBS has a good synopsis of the war, but for those who are more interested in Computer Science than Political/Military History, the short version goes like this:

South Indochina, now known as Vietnam, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia, has a long history of struggle for autonomy. Before French colonial rule (which began in the mid-1800s), South Indochina wrestled for regional independence from China. During World War Two, the Japanese conquered the area, only to be later “liberated” by the Allies, leading France to resume their colonial rule (as did the British in their colonial territories elsewhere in Asia and India). Following WWII, however, the people of South Indochina, having thrown off one oppressor, extended their anti-occupation efforts to fight the French instead of the Japanese, and in 1954 the French capitulated, signing the Geneva Peace Accords to formally grant Vietnam its independence. Unfortunately, global pressures perverted the efforts somewhat, and instead of a lasting peace agreement a temporary solution was created, dividing the nation at the 17th parallel, creating two nations where formerly no such division existed. Elections were to be held in 1956 to reunify the country, but the US feared that too much power would be given to the Communist Party of Vietnam through these elections, and instead backed a counter-Communist state south of the 17th parallel and formed a series of multilateral agreements around it, such as SEATO. The new nation of South Vietnam was born, and its first (dubiously) elected leader was Ngo Dinh Diem, a staunchly anti-Communist who almost immediately declared his country under Communist attack. The Eisenhower Administration remained supportive of the Diem government, but Diem’s loyalty with the people was almost nonexistent from the beginning.

By the time the US Democratic Party’s John F Kennedy came to the White House, things were coming to a head in South Vietnam. Kennedy sent a team to Vietnam to research the conditions there and help formulate his strategy on the issue. In what’s now known as the “December 1961 White Paper”, an argument for an increase in military, technical and economic aid was presented, along with large-scale American “advisers” to help stabilize the Diem government and eliminate the National Liberation Front, dubbed the $g(Viet Cong) by the US. What’s not as widely known, however, is that a number of Kennedy’s advisers argued against that buildup, calling Vietnam a “dead-end alley”.

Faced with two diametrically opposite paths, Kennedy, as was typical for his administration, chose a middle path: instead of either a massive commitment or a complete withdrawal, Kennedy instead chose to seek a limited settlement, sending aid but not large numbers of troops, a path that was almost doomed from the beginning. Through a series of strategic blunders, including the forced relocation of rural villagers (known as the Strategic Hamlet Program), Diem’s...