[2608.11436] When Agents Talk: Honeytokens under Shared Memory

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arXiv:2608.11436 (cs)

[Submitted on 11 Aug 2026]

Title:When Agents Talk: Honeytokens under Shared Memory

Authors:Joshua S. Gans<br>View a PDF of the paper titled When Agents Talk: Honeytokens under Shared Memory, by Joshua S. Gans

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Abstract:During a 2026 cyber-capability evaluation, short-lived AI agents turned a shared package repository into persistent memory, passing exploit findings to later agents and rebuilding the channel after it was removed. The broader evaluation culminated in an intrusion into Hugging Face. This episode raises a question for defensive deception: can a honeytoken be harmless to trusted agents without becoming recognisable to an attacker who shares their information and can implement the trusted policy? The answer is no. A trusted rule that selects genuine objects while avoiding decoys can be copied by the attacker, while a total-variation bound limits legitimate compatibility when decoys resemble genuine objects. Shared memory creates a second leakage channel by pooling weak fingerprints. For a fixed candidate, repeated non-triggering probes drive the minimum Bayes classification error to zero when type-dependent response laws differ and are known or learnable. If probing triggers containment, learning also requires the coalition to remain active long enough. Transfer across objects requires a stable deployment rule and information that orients the classes. A separate detection bound distinguishes reliable token activation from reliable attack coverage. The architectural response is to keep token identity in a private reference monitor and route legitimate agents through a provenance-enforcing broker. This produces high-confidence detection only for a specified policy violation. Honeytokens remain useful sensors, but a separate security boundary is still required.

Comments:<br>artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, honeytokens, defensive deception, shared memory, intrusion detection

Subjects:

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)

Cite as:<br>arXiv:2608.11436 [cs.CR]

(or<br>arXiv:2608.11436v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.11436

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arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history<br>From: Joshua Gans [view email]<br>[v1]<br>Tue, 11 Aug 2026 21:03:19 UTC (25 KB)

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