[2608.17043] Remote-Timer-as-a-Service: Efficient Microarchitectural Leakage in the Cloud with Remote Timers
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
arXiv:2608.17043 (cs)
[Submitted on 17 Aug 2026]
Title:Remote-Timer-as-a-Service: Efficient Microarchitectural Leakage in the Cloud with Remote Timers
Authors:Martin Schwarzl, Haocheng Xiao, Albert Pedersen, Sam Ainsworth, Nigel Topham<br>View a PDF of the paper titled Remote-Timer-as-a-Service: Efficient Microarchitectural Leakage in the Cloud with Remote Timers, by Martin Schwarzl and 4 other authors
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Abstract:Edge computing solutions have become a crucial part of the industry, delivering fast, flexible and scalable applications close to the end users, with typical use cases including dynamic content creation, image resizing and chatbots. Cloudflare Workers is one such framework, which handles millions of HTTP requests per second worldwide. To reduce start-up latency, Cloudflare Workers removes process-isolation boundaries between multiple tenants and leverages language-level isolation. This architecture poses the risk of Spectre attacks. To mitigate these, Cloudflare Workers previously introduced several countermeasures such as restricted timer measurements, no shared memory, no multithreading and Dynamic Process Isolation (DyPrIs), detecting potential attacks and process-isolating potentially malicious scripts.
We demonstrate that the production implementation of DyPrIs was insufficient. We adopt microarchitectural amplification techniques and discover various possibilities to measure time in the production environment of Cloudflare Workers. Given these techniques, we show that freezing and coarsening timers in the Cloudflare Workers security model is insufficient. Leveraging both timing amplification and remote timers, we demonstrate a remote Spectre attack that leaks a JWT token from a co-located victim worker in the Cloudflare Workers production environment. We outperform the existing attack by orders of magnitude, going from 2 bit/min to up to 12 bit/s at an accuracy of 99.16%, posing an immediate risk to customer data. Following our end-to-end attack, Cloudflare Workers mitigated it in a coordinated effort by integrating the V8 Sandbox limiting transient access to 64-bit pointers, improving the detection capabilities of DyPrIs, and deploying hardware-assisted MPK-based in-process isolation to confine each tenant heap under a dedicated memory-protection key.
Subjects:
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as:<br>arXiv:2608.17043 [cs.CR]
(or<br>arXiv:2608.17043v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.17043
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arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
Submission history<br>From: Martin Schwarzl [view email]<br>[v1]<br>Mon, 17 Aug 2026 18:41:36 UTC (470 KB)
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View a PDF of the paper titled Remote-Timer-as-a-Service: Efficient Microarchitectural Leakage in the Cloud with Remote Timers, by Martin Schwarzl and 4 other authors<br>View PDF<br>HTML (experimental)<br>TeX Source
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